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FORUM

Competency of Attesting Witnesses
by Judith Ann Cross

The revelation of someone's final
disposition of his earthly goods after
death is inherently dramatic. The
reading of a will is a standard scene in
many a novel or theatrical piece, and
it is never a scene which readers or
observers find boring.
Prior to the Statute of Frauds,
ancient English wills held no secrets
for revelation after death. Each will
was a transcript of an oral public
presentation given by the testator
before witnesses. The will was recorded in the hand of a scribe, presumably an ecclesiastic; the names of
the witnesses and the date recorded
were in the same hand, and not by
signatures. The witnesses were occasionally numerous, over twenty, and
it is likely that most of them were
illiterate.
We can trace the formalities of
modern wills to the Statute of Frauds,
which required that a testamentary
instrument be subscribed to by attesting witnesses. The standard of competency for an attesting witness is a
requirement of substantive law and is
not directly affected by the laws of
evidence. Recently, in McGarvey v.
McGarvey, 286 Md. 19, 405 A.2d 250

(1979), the Maryland Court of Appeals
relaxed the standard of competency
for attesting witnesses in Maryland.
In McGarvey the appellant, Raymond
C. McGarvey, Jr., offered for probate
a document, purporting to be the last
will and testament of Helen McGarvey
Saul, executed in 1969. The appellee,
Joseph J. McGarvey, filed a caveat
contesting the validity of the alleged
will on multiple grounds-one being
that of the two subscribing witnesses,
one was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury and was therefore not competent or credible to act
as an attesting witness. The caveator's
challenge was two-fold. He correctly
relied on MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE

ANN. § 4-102 (1974) (hereinafter cited
as the Testamentary Acts) which provides that every will shall be attested

and signed by two or more credible
witnesses. However, his reliance on
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 9101 et sq. (1980) (hereinafter cited as
the Evidence Acts), which provides that
no person who has been convicted of
a crime of perjury shall be permitted
to testify in any case or proceeding
whatsoever, was misplaced.
In interpreting the TestamentaryActs,
the court found that the statute requires every will to be attested to and
signed by two or more credible witnesses. Relying on Shaffer et al. v. Corbett, 3 H. & McH. 513 (1797), and
drawing an analogy between the Statute of Frauds and Maryland's Testamentary Acts, the court observed that
the word "credible" in the statute
means "competent." The Shaffer Court
first considered the Statute of Frauds
requirement that an attesting witness be credible. The court noted that
a requirement attesting witness be
credible would necessitate a factual
finding by a jury of every witness to a
will before the court could admit the
will to probate. Id. at 285. This would,
"...frustrate the provision of the statute, by putting it out of the power of
the testator, let his understanding or
caution be ever so great... and upon
this ground the meaning ought to be
rejected." Id. looking to the common
law interpretation of the Statute of
Frauds, the Shaffer Court cited both
Lord Mansfield as finding the word
credible to mean competent and Lord
Camden as rejecting the word credible as, "superflous and nugatory." Id.
The Shaffer Court held that, ". . .competence is included in the term witness, so the cause must be considered
as if it stood without the word credible." Id. at 286.
The McGarvey Court next considered the proper criteria for determining the competency of attesting witnesses. It rejected the proposition
that the statutory rules of evidence
apply. That is, if the witness is incompetent to testify in a proceeding as set

forth by the Evidence Acts, it does not
follow that he is incompetent to attest
to a will. The court found that there
has always been a difference between
proving a will and attesting to a will;
otherwise, the lengthy and repeated
discussions between competency to
attest to a will and competency to
prove a will in earlier Maryland case
law would be rendered mere surplusage.
The court turned to the common
law, having determined that the statu-

tory rules of evidence never addressed
the issue of attesting witness competency. At common law a witness
could not validly attest to a will if at
the time of attestation he was insane,
so young as to want discretion or
guilty of an infamous crime. McGarvey, at 25, 405 A.2d at 253 citing Blackstone's Commentaries.The court considered
the last of these disabilities in finding
that "the dead hand of the common
law rule.

. .should

no longer be app-

lied" to disqualify an attesting witness
to a will who has been convicted of an
infamous crime. Id. at 26, 405 A.2d at
254. The court has frequently stated:
"(I)t is our duty to determine the
common law as it exists in this state...
(T)he doctrine of stare decisis is not to
be construed as preventing us from
changing a rule of law if we are con-

vinced that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life." Id. at 27, 405 A.2d at 254.
The practical effect of McGarvey is
that an attesting witness with a criminal conviction will not render a will
void ab initio. If such a will is contested,
the administrator will have an opportunity to prove the will in court. "Any
other result would be a needless trap
for the unwary testator who, by failing to discover an attesting witness'
prior criminal record, risks having his
will declared void." Id. at 28, 405 A.2d
at 255.

However, pursuant to the Maryland Evidence Acts, an attesting witness
with a conviction of perjury is incompetent to testify to prove the will.
McGarvey; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.

grounds: that reference to an attesting witness' perjury conviction would
serve no other purpose except to
arouse the prejudice of the jury, and
that such a comment is not allowed
when the reasons for not calling a
witness are reasonable and proper. In
this situation it would be unethical
for the administrator to call an incompetent witness to the stand; thus his
failure to produce the attesting witness is both proper and reasonable.
Even though the McGarvey Court
relaxed the standard of competency
for attesting witnesses in Maryland,
most attorneys would prefer to follow stricter standards so that the
wills for which they are responsible
would be sufficient under the strict-

est standards of all states. Attorneys
should keep in mind that it is very
dangerous for the testator to call
upon subscribing witnesses who are
not acquainted with him. Certainly,
attesting witnesses with criminal
records, who are minors or who have
a psychiatric disability should be
avoided. Finally, the fact that an attesting witness is also an executor,
guardian named in the will or a beneficiary does not affect his competency. Estep v. Morris, 38 Md. 417 (1873);
Leitch v. Leitch, 114 Md. 336, 79 A. 600
(1911). Nonetheless, when choosing
attesting witnesses, common sense
should direct the wise attorney to also
avoid interested parties. Harrisv. Pue,
29 Md. 535 (1874).

CODE ANN. §9-104 (1980). The ad-

ministrator must rely on secondary
evidence. Maryland case law provides
two alternatives regarding the next
best evidence in such a case. In
Greenhawkv. Quimby, 170 Md. 280,184
A. 485 (1936), the court held that an
attesting witness' signature was properly proved, in his absence, by the
other subscribing witnesses, and by
others, testifying that they each saw
the absent witness sign the document
in the decedent's presence. In Keefer v.
Zimmerman, 22 Md. 274 (1864), the

court held that proof of an attesting
witness' handwriting is admissible
where the testimony of the subscribing witness cannot be procured by
reason of absence, death, interest or
other disqualification.
An administrator proving a will
should try to keep the absent attesting witness' perjury conviction from
the jury. It is well settled in a civil case
that failure of a party to produce a
witness who could testify on a material issue gives rise to an inference
that the testimony would be unfavorable. Hitch v. Hall, 42 Md. App. 260,
399 A.2d 953 (1979); Critzerv.Shegogue,
236 Md. 411, 204 A.2d 180 (1964);
(opposing counsel's right to a jury
instruction); Hoverter v. Patuxent, 231
Md. 608,188 A.2d 696 (1963), (oppos-

ing counsel's right to comment to the
jury during argument). Therefore,
the administrator should file a pretrial motion in limine based on two

Recent Developments
The Right to Die
by Lynn K. Caudle
The right to die, the constitutional
right to privacy, voluntary euthanasia, rational suicide, terminal care,
natural death acts, self deliverance,
self determination. . .are all terms
which courts are increasingly confronting as people seek to have a voice
in determining whether their lives
must be artificially prolonged where
there is no hope for cure and death is
imminent. In recent years, courts
have been called upon to determine if
a terminally ill person has the right to
refuse or discontinue medical treatment. This issue arises in two contexts. The most frequent situation
involves an incompetent patient for
whom a third party is seeking to be
appointed guardian for the purpose
of making the patient's medical decisions. The question has also been
raised in instances where the patient is
competent to make his own decisions.
A competent individual has the
right to refuse medical treatment
unless the state can demonstrate a
compelling interest that would justify

